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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Dunn appeals from the district court's order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion and, because the motion was filed within fourteen days 
of the entry of his Judgment of Conviction, his appeal is also timely from his Judgment 
of Conviction. On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred in admitting 
impermissible I.RE. 404(b) evidence in the form of the testimony of C.R. and Detectives 
Lawrence and McKenna as the probative value of this evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. He also asserts that the court 
erroneously admitted a portion of the testimony of Detective McKenna, discussing a 
conversation that he had with Mr. Dunn regarding prior sexual misconduct with C.R., 
because it was not presented for the limited purpose of showing that Mr. Dunn had 
admitted to previously abusing C.R., but for another purpose, to characterize Mr. Dunn 
as a liar. Mr. Dunn asserts that even if these errors are found to be harmless 
individually, that the accumulation of errors necessitates a reversal of his convictions. 
Alternatively, Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his 
case which requires the vacation of his Judgment of Conviction or the Order Denying 
Motion on his Rule 35 motion. During the sentencing hearing and at the Rule 35 
hearing, the prosecution committed misconduct when it discussed Mr. Dunn's refusal to 
participate in a psychosexual evaluation as an aggravating circumstance. This 
misconduct resulted in Mr. Dunn being denied due process of law and amounted to a 
violation of his right to refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, rights that are 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
and Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Although defense counsel did not object to 
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these instances of misconduct, Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct 
amounted to fundamental error and was not harmless. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of ProceedinQs 
On December 20, 2012, an Information was filed charging Mr. Dunn with three 
counts of lewd conduct and with a repeat sexual offender sentencing enhancement. 
(R., pp.55-58.) The charges were the result of a report to police that Mr. Dunn had 
been inappropriately touching S.E. and A.D. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Mr. Dunn entered not guilty pleas to the charges. (R., pp.59-
60.) 
The State filed a Motion in Limine requesting a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility 
of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, evidence that Mr. Dunn had previously molested other 
children. (R., pp.67-68.) Specifically, the State sought to introduce testimony that 
Mr. Dunn had abused his daughters, C.R.1 and B.J. (R., p.79.) The State asserted that 
there were similarities between the conduct with C.R. and the three alleged victims: 
Mr. Dunn was a father figure to all involved and the alleged sexual touching was similar 
to that of the touching of C.R. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.24, L.9 - p.26, L.16.) Defense counsel 
argued that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial 
effect. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.30, Ls.20-24, p.35, Ls.8-11.) The district court specifically found 
that the evidence was relevant under I.RE. 404(b) to show a common plan or scheme. 
(Tr. 8/15/13, p.63, Ls.20-23.) However, the district court did not address the prejudicial 
1 C.R. is also referred to as C.D. at different times throughout the case. Although she is 
now an adult, because she was a victim as a child, only her initials will be used to 
identify her in this Appellant's Brief. 
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effect of admitting the LR. E. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.55, L.3 - p.64, L.9.) The 
case proceeded to trial. (R., p.115.) 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of all three alleged victims. S.E. 
testified that Mr. Dunn was a grandfather/father figure to her and that from the ages of 
six through thirteen he touched her in a sexual manner: hand to vagina and mouth to 
vagina. (Tr. Trial 1, p.9, Ls.16-19, p.20, L.8 - p.22, L.11, p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.6, p.87, 
Ls.2-9, p.107, L.21 - p.108, L.18.)2 A.O. testified that Mr. Dunn was stepfather/father 
figure to her and that from fifth grade until she was fourteen, he touched her in a sexual 
manner: hand to vagina and mouth to vagina. (Tr. Trial 1, p.132, Ls.8-11, p.155, Ls.13-
22, p.157, L.11 -p.158, L.10, p.167, Ls.13-14.) M.T. testified that her father was not 
always present in her life and that Mr. Dunn filled that role in her life. (Tr. Trial 1, p.201, 
L.20 - p.202, L.22.) She also testified that Mr. Dunn molested her for four years by 
touching her vagina with his hands, and that the last touching occurred in the summer of 
2011. (Tr. Trial 1, p.203, Ls.6-22.) 
Prior to C.R. testifying, defense counsel renewed his objections to the 
presentation of C.R.'s testimony. (Tr. Trial 1, p.237, Ls.10-25.) The State reiterated 
that the evidence was relevant because of the similar relationships - Mr. Dunn being a 
father figure to S.E., A.O., and M.T. and being the father of C.R. - and the similarities 
between the charged conduct and the prior conduct with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.8-
18.) The prosecution also noted that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. (Tr. Trial 
1, p.238, Ls.20-23.) Ultimately, the court found that the evidence was relevant to prove 
2 The transcript of the trial is broken into two separate transcripts. For ease of 
reference, the transcript of the testimony at trial will be cited as Tr. Trial 1. The 
transcript of the vior dire, opening and closing arguments, return of jury verdict, and 
post-verdict activities will be cited as Tr. Trial 2. 
3 
a common plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.2-8.) 
C.R. testified that she is the daughter of Mr. Dunn. (Tr. Trial 1, p.249, Ls.4-8.) 
When she was eleven to twelve years old, Mr. Dunn placed his mouth on her vagina. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.250, Ls.1-16.) She specifically remembered this occurring on two 
occasions, although she believed it happened on additional occasions. (Tr. Trial 1, 
p.250, Ls.4-8.) Following her testimony, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.257, L.18 - p.258, L.9.) 
The State then called Detective Brent Lawrence, the officer that investigated the 
charges involving C.R. back in 1995. (Tr. Trial 1, p.260, L.12 - p.262, L.20.) Detective 
Lawrence testified that he had spoken to Mr. Dunn at the time, and that he admitted to 
touching C.R.'s vagina with his hands and mouth on a couple of occasions. (Tr. Trial 1, 
p.262, L.15 - p.264, L.12.) 
The State also presented the testimony of Detective Patrick McKenna, the 
detective who investigated the charges in the case at hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.317, L.13 -
p.321, L.21.) Detective McKenna testified about an interview he conducted with 
Mr. Dunn in which Mr. Dunn discussed the incident with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.341, L.4 -
p.344, L.16.) In response to a question, the detective testified that Mr. Dunn had 
claimed that his criminal conduct was an isolated incident that occurred on one 
occasion for about a minute and a half. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.6-10.) Defense counsel 
then objected. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.11-16.) The court sustained the objection and 
asked the jury to disregard the response. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, L.25 - p.344, L.2.) 
Detective McKenna was then asked if the statement made by Mr. Dunn in the interview 
was different than the statements he made to Detective Lawrence in 1995 and he 
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responded that it was. (Tr. Trial ·1, p.344, Ls.9-11.) Defense counsel again objected. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.12-13.) The objection was overruled by the court and the jury was 
allowed to consider the answer. (Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.14-15.) 
Mr. Dunn testified on his own behalf. (Tr. Trial 1, p.417, Ls.17-22.) Although he 
admitted that he had been convicted of lewd conduct for his actions with C.R., he 
maintained his innocence as to the pending charges and specifically denied committing 
the acts he was charged with. (Tr. Trial 1, p.419, Ls.4-17, p.452, L.20 - p.453, L. 12.) 
The jury found Mr. Dunn guilty of each of the three lewd conduct charges. 
(R., p.153.) Following the return of the jury verdict, Mr. Dunn pied guilty being a 
persistent sexual offender. (Tr. Trial 2, p.202, L.6 - p.203, L.11.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 
when he encouraged the district court to punish Mr. Dunn for exercising his 
constitutional rights by refusing to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. 
(Tr. 2/10/14, p.18, L.15 - p.20, L.24.) The State requested imposition of fixed life 
sentences. (Tr. 2/10/14, p.23, Ls.18-19.) Defense counsel recommended a fixed 15 
year sentence. (Tr. 2/10/14, p.27, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Dunn was sentenced to three 
concurrent fixed life sentences. (R., pp.164-165.) 
Mr. Dunn filed a Rule 35 motion within 14 days of the filing of the Judgment of 
Conviction. (R., p.167.) At the Rule 35 hearing, the prosecutor again presented 
improper argument erroneously encouraging the district court to consider the 
defendant's refusal to participate in a psychosexual evaluation as aggravating evidence. 
(Tr. 4/7/14, p.7, L.25 - p.9, L.5.) The motion was denied. (R., p.172.) Mr. Dunn filed a 
Notice of Appeal timely from the Order Denying Motion. (R., pp.174-178.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that 
was unfairly prejudicial? 
2. Did the district court err in allowing the State to present evidence regarding a 
statement Mr. Dunn made to Detective McKenna that showed Mr. Dunn had 
minimized or lied to the detective about his prior conduct with C.R., as this 
evidence exceeded the scope of the pretrial order allowing only limited I.R.E. 
404(b) evidence? 
3. Did the accumulation of errors deprive Mr. Dunn of his right to a fair trial? 
4. Did the State violate Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights when it committed 
prosecutorial misconduct at the sentencing and Rule 35 hearings? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
L 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting LR.E. 404(b) Evidence That Was 
Unfairly Prejudicial 
A Introduction 
Mr. Dunn asserts that the district court erred in admitting irnpermissible Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence in the form of the testimony of C.R. and Detectives 
Lawrence and McKenna, who testified about statements Mr. Dunn made to them 
regarding the sexual abuse of C.R. He asserts that the probative value of this evidence 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
B. Applicable Jurisprudence 
Idaho appellate Courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
lower court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 
882, 888 (2004). Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to show a defendant's criminal propensity. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 
667 (2010). "It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident," if the prosecution has provided notice that it intends to produce the 
evidence. Id.; I.RE. 404(b). Yet, under I.RE. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded 
"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 
State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 219 (2000). 
In determining whether I.RE. 404(b) evidence was properly admitted, the 
appellate court employs a two-step analysis, determining: (1) whether, under 
I.RE. 404(b), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the 
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defendant's character or criminal propensity; and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the 
district court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Johnson, 
148 Idaho at 667 (citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999)). However, 
"evidence of a person's actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate issue 
for trial, is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 
114,119 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948,950 (Ct. App. 
1990). Determinations of relevancy involve an issue of law and are reviewed de nova. 
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 501 (1999); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 218 (Ct. 
App. 2009). When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence 
is not outweighed by unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. 
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. Relevant Factual Information 
Prior to trial, the State filed a Motion in Limine requesting a pre-trial ruling on the 
admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, evidence that Mr. Dunn had previously molested 
other children. (R., pp.67-68.) Specifically, the State sought to introduce testimony that 
Mr. Dunn had abused his daughters, C.R. and B.J. (R., p.79.) In the Memorandum in 
Support of State's Motion in Limine, the State asserted the evidence was admissible for 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake of accident. (R., p.78.) The State also asserted that the evidence showed a 
common plan because the alleged victims were "of similar ages or that he had a similar 
relationship with them" and that the sexual acts were committed in similar ways. 
(R., pp.78-86.) 
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At the !.RE. 404(b) hearing, the State presented the testimony of Detective 
Lawrence, the officer that worked on the 1995 case involving allegations that Mr. Dunn 
had sexually abused C.R. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.10, L.23 - p.16, L.3.) During his testimony, a 
1995 police report that included a report that Mr. Dunn had admitted to engaging in lewd 
conduct with C.R. was admitted as an exhibit. (Motion in Umine, State's Exhibit 1.) The 
State also presented the testimony of Detective McKenna, the detective investigating 
the current charges, who testified that Mr. Dunn had admitted to committing lewd 
conduct with C.R. and to have a conviction for his actions. (Tr. 7 /8/13, p.17, L.3 - p.18, 
L.22.) Finally, the State presented the testimony of another alleged victim, B.J.3 
(Tr. 7/8/13, p.23, Ls.2-5.) 
The State asserted that there were similarities between the conduct with C.R. 
and the three alleged victims: Mr. Dunn was a father figure to all involved and the 
alleged sexual touching was similar to that of the touching of C.R. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.24, L.9 
- p.26, L.16.) Defense counsel argued that the probative value of the evidence was 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.30, Ls.20-24, p.35, Ls.8-11.) In 
ruling that the evidence was admissible, the district court noted the special fatherly 
relationship that Mr. Dunn had, or had cultivated, with both C.R. and the alleged victims 
in the case at hand, that the conduct was of a similar nature, and that the alleged 
victims were all near the same ages. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.61, L.10-p.63, L.20.) The district 
court specifically found that the evidence was relevant under I.RE. 404(b) to show a 
common plan or scheme. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.63, Ls.20-23.) However, the district court did 
3 The district court found that the testimony of B.J. was inadmissible under I.RE. 404(b). 
(R, p.89.) 
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not address the prejudicial effect of the admittance of the LR.E. 404(b) evidence. 
(Tr. 8/15/13, p.55, L.3 - p.64, L.9.) 
Defense counsel conceded that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was proven as a fact. 
(Tr. 7/8/13, p.33, Ls.2-14.) Although defense counsel asserted that the proffered 
evidence was not admissible under LR.E. 404(b), counsel conceded that the evidence 
may be admissible to prove opportunity, intent, preparation, and plan. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.33, 
Ls.22 - p.35, L.8.) 
At trial, the LR.E. 404(b) evidence was mentioned early by the prosecution. In 
voir dire, the prosecution mentioned that the jury would hear evidence that Mr. Dunn 
had sexually abused a child about 18 years earlier.4 (Tr. Trial 2, p.70, Ls.9-12, p.71, 
Ls.14-18, p.73, Ls.10-15.) In its opening statement, the prosecution noted that the jury 
would hear from C.R. (Tr. Trial 2, p.120, Ls.16-18.) The prosecution informed the jury 
that the purpose of hearing her testimony was to "draw the similarities" between the 
alleged conduct with the three alleged victims and conduct toward C.R. and to show the 
"type of drive this defendant has." (Tr. Trial 2, p.120, Ls.18-22.) 
During the State's case in chief, the State presented the testimony of all three 
alleged victims. S.E. testified that Mr. Dunn was a grandfather/father figure to her. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.9, Ls.16-19.) At the age of six, Mr. Dunn began touching her 
inappropriately by touching her vaginal area with his hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.20, L.8 - p.22, 
L.11.) She also testified that Mr. Dunn would put his mouth on her vagina and that he 
tried to make her touch his penis on one occasion. (Tr. Trial 1, p.22, L.12 - p.23, L.6.) 
The touching continued until she was thirteen years old. (Tr. Trial 1, p.87, Ls.2-9, 
4 In response to this information being provided to the jury, defense counsel then 
discussed the previous sexual abuse and informed the jury that Mr. Dunn had been 
convicted and served his sentence. (Tr. Trial 2, p.85, Ls.7-20.) 
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p.107, L.21 - p.108, L.18.) A.O. testified that Mr. Dunn was stepfather/father figure to 
her. (Tr. Trial 1, p.132, Ls.8-11.) She discussed that he had touched her vagina with 
his hands and his mouth. (Tr. Trial 1, p.155, Ls.13-22.) She also stated that on a 
couple of occasions he made her touch his penis. (Tr. Trial 1, p.156, Ls.12-23.) The 
touching began when she was in the fifth grade and lasted until December of 2011, 
when she was fourteen. (Tr. Trial 1, p.157, L.11 - p.158, L.10, p.167, Ls.13-14.) M.T. 
testified that her father was not always present in her life and that Mr. Dunn filled that 
role in her life. (Tr. Trial 1, p.201, L.20 - p.202, L.22.) M.T. testified that Mr. Dunn 
molested her for four years by touching her vagina with his hands, and that the last 
touching occurred in the summer of 2011. (Tr. Trial 1, p.203, Ls.6-22.) 
Prior to C.R. testifying, defense counsel renewed his objections to the 
presentation of C.R.'s testimony noting that it was in violation of I.R.E. 404(b), the 
United States and Idaho Constitutions, and that even if the evidence was admissible 
under I.R.E. 404(b), its probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.237, Ls.10-25.) The State reiterated that the evidence was relevant 
because of the similar relationships - Mr. Dunn being a father figure to S.E., A.O., and 
M.T. and being the father of C.R. - and the similarities between the charged conduct 
and the prior conduct with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.8-18.) The prosecution also 
noted that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. (Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.20-23.) The 
district court reiterated its ruling noting that the circumstances of the prior conduct had 
been proven to be fact, that the evidence "falls within the common plan that each of 
these witnesses independently testified that he played the role of father," "presents a 
common plan or a common scheme," that the acts are similar, the alleged victims are 
similarly aged, and the circumstances are very similar. (Tr. Trial 1, p.245, L.21 - p.246, 
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L.19.) Ultimately, the court noted that the evidence was relevant to prove a common 
plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake. (Tr. Trial 1, 
p.247, Ls.2-8.) 
C.R. testified that she is the daughter of Mr. Dunn. (Tr. Trial 1, p.249, Ls.4-8.) 
When she was eleven to twelve years old, Mr. Dunn placed his mouth on her vagina. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.250, Ls.1-16.) She specifically remembered this occurring on two 
occasions, although she believed it happened on additional occasions. (Tr. Trial 1, 
p.250, Ls.4-8.) Following her testimony, the jury was instructed that: 
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant committed crimes, wrongs, or acts other than that for which the 
defendant is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by 
you to prove the defendant's character or that the defendant has a 
disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence may be considered by you 
only for the limited purpose of proving the defendant's motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake of 
accident. 
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. At the time 
this evidence was admitted, this Court now wants you to not consider the 
evidence by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which 
it was admitted. Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except 
the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.257, L.18 - p.258, L.9.) It was also brought to the juror's attention that the 
next witness would be testifying for the same purpose. (Tr. Trial 1, p.258, Ls.11-24.) 
The State then called Detective Brent Lawrence, the officer that investigated the 
charges involving C.R. back in 1995. (Tr. Trial 1, p.260, L.12 - p.262, L.20.) Detective 
Lawrence testified that he had spoken to Mr. Dunn at the time and that he admitted to 
touching C.R.'s vagina with his hands and mouth on a couple of occasions. (Tr. Trial 1, 
p.262, L.15-p.264, L.12.) 
The State also presented the testimony of Detective Patrick McKenna, the 
detective who investigated the charges in the case at hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.317, L.13 -
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p.321, L.21.) After testifying about his investigation in the case at hand, Detective 
McKenna testified about an interview he conducted with Mr. Dunn in which Mr. Dunn 
discussed the incident with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.341, L.4 - p.344, L.16.) 
Following the close of evidence, the district court again provided the jury with 
limiting instructions.5 (R., pp.146-147.) Defense counsel objected to this instruction as 
part of a continuing objection to the I.RE. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. Trial 2, p.140, Ls.9-19.) 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Rule 404(b) Evidence That 
Was Unfairly Prejudicial 
1. Relevancy 
Evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) 
(citation omitted.). In order to make this determination, "the trial court must determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." Id. 
(citations omitted.) "The trial court must then determine whether the other crime or 
wrong is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other 
than propensity." Id. (citations omitted.) 
a. Offer Of Proof 
Defense counsel conceded that the I.RE. 404(b) evidence was proven as a fact. 
(Tr. 7/8/13, p.33, Ls.2-14.) As such, Mr. Dunn does not challenge this finding in this 
appeal. 
5 The instructions where the same as or similar to those read to the jury 
contemporaneously with the admittance of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (R., pp.146-
147.) 
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b. Relevance For A Non-Propensity Pur, ose 
"Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to 
I.R.E. 404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to 
demonstrate the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." Grist, 14 7 Idaho 
at 52. Evidence of uncharged bad acts is admissible if relevant to a material issue such 
as motive, intent, mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, and identity. State v. 
Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 155 (Ct. App. 1986); See also LR.E. 404(b). 
The district court specifically found that the evidence was relevant under 
LR.E. 404(b) to show a common plan or scheme. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.63, Ls.20-23.) During 
trial, the district court reiterated its ruling and noted that the evidence was relevant to 
prove a common plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.2-8.) Although defense counsel asserted that the proffered 
evidence was not admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) counsel conceded that the evidence 
may be admissible to prove opportunity, intent, preparation, and plan. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.33, 
Ls.22 - p.35, L.8.) Accordingly, Mr. Dunn is unable to challenge the admittance of the 
evidence on relevancy grounds.6 
2. The Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Evidence Was More 
Prejudicial Than Probative 
In the case at hand, defense counsel repeatedly addressed the overly prejudicial 
nature of the proposed I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.30, Ls.20-24, p.35, Ls.8-
11; Tr. Trial 1, p.237, Ls.10-25.) However, the district court did not ever address the 
6 Despite trial counsel's concession, Mr. Dunn asserts that the evidence was not 
actually admissible for a non-propensity purpose and reserves the right to challenge the 
concession as constituting ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction, should 
such filing be necessary. 
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prejudicial effect of admitting the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.55, L.3 - p.64, 
L.9; Tr. Trial 1, p.239, L.16 - p.247, L.13.) 
"[T]he Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of a// evidence in the 
courts of this State." State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010), (quoting State v. 
Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009) (emphasis in original)). To exclude evidence under 
I.R.E. 403, the trial court must address whether the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by one of the considerations listed in the Rule. Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471 
( quoting Meister, 148 Idaho at 241 ). 
The district court clearly abused its discretion when it failed to address whether 
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial 
effect. Mr. Dunn asserts that on this basis alone, his case must be remanded for a new 
trial. 
Alternatively, he asserts that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was unfairly prejudicial 
and that the evidence should have been excluded under I.RE. 403. Under I.RE. 403, 
relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, inter a/ia, the probative value 
of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the evidence would involve needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254 (1995). To 
some extent all probative evidence is prejudicial. State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88 
(Ct. App. 1989). The question is whether that prejudice is unfair; whether it harms the 
defendant because it is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict regardless 
of other facts presented. Id. 
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While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this 
discretion is not without limits. As noted by the court in Stoddard: 
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other 
crimes, having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference 
that [the] accused is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, 
must be excluded. The leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite 
direction, empowering the judge to exclude other-crimes evidence, even 
when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its 
probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir 
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration 
of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not only 
leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this question of 
balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be corrected on 
appeal as an abuse of discretion. 
State V. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 537 (Ct. App. 1983), (quoting McCORMICK, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW ON EVIDENCE § 190 (Cleary ed. 1972). Additionally, as with all matters of 
discretion on the part of the district court, the court's determination of whether the 
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential prejudice must comport 
with applicable legal standards. See, e.g., Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 70 (2007) 
(finding an abuse of discretion when the district court's action was not consistent with 
applicable legal standards). 
In this case, assuming that the evidence is relevant, it was highly prejudicial. 
Allowing the detectives to testify, permitted the presentation cumulative evidence that 
further increased the prejudicial nature of the 404(b) evidence. Prior sexual misconduct 
evidence is undeniably, highly prejudicial in general. As Justice Bistline wrote in Moore: 
Balancing the prejudice against the probative value is especially vital in 
sex abuse cases where the possibility for unfair prejudice is at its 
highest. 
Once the accused has been characterized as a person of abnormal bent, 
driven by biological inclination, it seems relatively easy to arrive at the 
conclusion that he must be guilty, he could not help but be otherwise. 
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State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 748 (1991) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Slough and Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 iowA L. REV. 325, 333-34 
(1956)). 
Although Mr. Dunn cannot challenge whether the I.RE. 404(b) testimony is 
relevant on appeal, he asseiis that the probative value is very low. The I.RE. 404(b) 
evidence presented in this case was overly prejudicial and the prejudicial effect 
outweighs the limited probative value. Mr. Dunn was charged with engaging in the 
criminal molestation of three minors to whom he was a father figure. The I.RE. 404(b) 
evidence involved the molestation of Mr. Dunn's daughter in the mid-1990s. As 
discussed by Justice Bistline, evidence that a person has engaged in prior sexually 
deviant acts is prejudicial in and of itself. However, in the case at hand, unlike the 
standard presentation of I.RE 404(b) evidence, the jury was allowed to hear about the 
incident involving C.R. through three witnesses. The State presented testimony of 
seven witnesses in total. (See generally Tr. Trial 1.) Three of the seven witnesses' 
testimony focused, at least in part, on the events of the 1990s molestation of C.R. As a 
result, this evidence highlighted the events involving C.R. more than was necessary to 
serve the purpose of I.R.E. 404(b). The State unnecessarily presented the testimony of 
the detectives to bolster the testimony of C.R. and created an atmosphere of prejudice 
far more unfair than a typical case where this type of evidence is admitted. 
Not only was the evidence overly highlighted in the presentation of the case in 
chief, it was brought to the attention of the jury before the jury had even been selected. 
During voir dire, the prosecution informed the jury that the purpose of hearing C.R. 
testimony was to "draw the similarities" between the alleged conduct with the three 
alleged victims and conduct toward C.R. and to show the "type of drive this defendant 
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has." (Tr. Trial 2, p.120, Ls.18-22.) In fact, the State's argument that the evidence 
would be presented to show the defendant's "drive" and the "similarities" of the abuse 
was tantamount to informing the jury that because Mr. Dunn had sexually abused his 
C.R. he must have also abused the alleged victims. This is precisely the type 
propensity that is not permitted under I.R.E. 404(b). 
Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an unjust 
influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either: (1) a 
presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time; or (2) an 
opinion that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed the charged 
crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. State v. Wood, 
126 Idaho 241, 244-45 (Ct. App. 1994 ). "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence) is 
that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime 
on trial because he is a man of criminal character." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (quoting 
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)). Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of 
character evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have 
acted consistently with those past acts or traits. Id. 
Where a significant portion of the trial focused on the prior bad acts of Mr. Dunn 
and the jury was conditioned to consider the evidence for an impermissible propensity 
purpose during vior dire, the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed its probative 
value. Furthermore, this was a case where there was no physical evidence introduced. 
The jury was forced to believe either Mr. Dunn's assertions of innocence or the 
assertions of his accusers. In a case where credibility is a central issue, this type of 
evidence could easily interfere with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision. 
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Simply, the jury was overwhelmed with evidence of uncharged conduct; 
undoubtedly, it considered Mr. Dunn to be a man of criminal character. In a type of 
case where the danger of unfair prejudice is very high, and the jury heard witness after 
witness describe uncharged conduct, the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
exclude the evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403. 
E. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That Admitting The Evidence Was Harmless 
Error 
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court: "To hold an error as 
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the 
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous 
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden 
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227 (2010). 
In this instance, because the error was objected to, it is the State's burden to 
prove that the admittance of the evidence did not contribute to the conviction. Mr. Dunn 
maintains that the error was not harmless because the prejudicial effect of the jury 
improperly hearing the I.RE. 404(b) evidence may have influenced the jury's ability to 
be impartial despite jury instructions attempting to limit the purpose for which the jury 
considered the evidence. 
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11. 
The District Court Erred In Allowin The State To Present Evidence Re ardin A 
Statement Mr. Dunn Made To Detective McKenna, That Showed Mr. Dunn Had 
Minimized Or Lied To The Detective About His Prior Conduct With C.R., As This 
Evidence Fxceeded The Scope Of The Pretrial Order Allowing Only I imited I.R.E. 
404(b) Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The State introduced the testimony of Detective McKenna, in part, to discuss a 
conversation that he had with Mr. Dunn regarding prior sexual misconduct with C.R. 
However, the testimony was not presented for the limited purpose of showing that 
Mr. Dunn had admitted to previously abusing C.R., but for another purpose, to 
characterize Mr. Dunn as a liar. The admissibility of this evidence of lying was not 
addressed pretrial and it was error for the district court to admit the evidence. 
B. Applicable Jurisprudence 
The standards of review and general law pertaining to 1.R.E. 404(b) and 
I.R.E. 403 are cited in section l(B) above and are incorporated herein by reference. 
C. Relevant Factual Information 
The State filed a Motion in Limine requesting a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility 
of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, evidence that Mr. Dunn had previously molested other 
children. (R., pp.67-68.) Specifically, the State sought to introduce testimony that 
Mr. Dunn had abused his daughter, C.R. (R., p.79.) In the Memorandum in Support of 
State's Motion in Limine, the State asserted the evidence was admissible for proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
of accident. (R., p. 78.) The State also asserted that the evidence showed a common 
plan because the alleged victims were "of similar ages or that he had a similar 
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relationship with them" and that the sexual acts were committed in similar ways. 
(R., pp.78-86.) 
At the I.R.E. 404(b) hearing, the State presented the testimony of Detective 
McKenna, the detective investigating the current charges, who testified that Mr. Dunn 
had admitted to committing lewd conduct with C.R. and to have a conviction for his 
actions. (Tr. 7/8/13, p.17, L.3 - p.18, L.22.) The State again asserted that there were 
similarities between the conduct with C.R. and the three alleged victims. (Tr. 7/8/13, 
p.24, L.9 - p.26, L.16.) The district court specifically found that the evidence was 
relevant under I.R.E. 404(b) to show a common plan or scheme. (Tr. 8/15/13, p.63, 
Ls.20-23.) 
Prior to C.R. testifying, defense counsel renewed his objections to the 
presentation of C.R.'s testimony. (Tr. Trial 1, p.237, ls.10-25.) The State reiterated 
that the evidence was relevant because of the similar relationships and the similarities 
between the charged conduct and the prior conduct with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.238, Ls.8-
18.) The district court noted that the evidence was relevant to prove a common plan or 
scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and absence of mistake. (Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.2-
8.) 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of Detective McKenna, the detective 
who investigated the charges in the case at hand. (Tr. Trial 1, p.317, L.13 - p.321, 
L.21.) After testifying about his investigation in the case at hand, Detective McKenna 
testified about an interview he conducted with Mr. Dunn in which Mr. Dunn discussed 
the incident with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.341, L.4 - p.344, L.16.) Prior to his testimony 
about this specific portion of the interrogation, the jury was again provided a limiting 
instruction. (Tr. Trial 1, p.340, Ls.12-23.) 
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At the beginning of Detective McKenna's testimony regarding the incident with 
C.R., defense counsel objected on a cumulative basis. (Tr. Trial 1, p.341, Ls.4-22.) 
The State argued that the evidence would be different than what the jury had heard 
before, "we're also going to draw some inconsistencies in the statements, which would 
be for impeachment purposes." (Tr. Trial 1, p.342, Ls.2-4.) The court allowed the 
testimony. (Tr. Trial 1, p.342, L.10.) Detective McKenna testified that Mr. Dunn told him 
he had been convicted of fondling and having oral sex with his daughter, C.R. (Tr. Trial 
1, p.342, Ls.14-19.) In response to a question, the detective then testified that Mr. Dunn 
had claimed that his criminal conduct was an isolated incident that occurred on one 
occasion for about a minute and a half. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.6-10.) Defense counsel 
then objected, asserting that the answer was beyond the scope of the allowed 404(b) 
testimony and beyond the scope of the limiting instruction. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, Ls.11-16.) 
The court sustained the objection and asked the jury to disregard the response. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.343, L.25 - p.344, L.2.) In response to a question from the State, the 
district court noted it was granting the objection because it was premature to introduce 
the statement as impeachment. (Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.3-7.) Detective McKenna was 
then asked if the statement made by Mr. Dunn in the interview was different than the 
statements he made to Detective Lawrence in 1995, and he responded that it was. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.9-11.) Defense counsel again objected on the same grounds. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.12-13.) The objection was overruled and the jury was allowed to 
consider the answer. (Tr. Trial 1, p.344, Ls.14-15.) 
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D. The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Present Evidence Regardin9_6 
Statement Made To Detective McKenna By Mr. Dunn, That Showed Mr. Dunn 
Had Minimized Or Lied To The Detective About His Prior Conduct With C.R., As 
This Evidence Exceeded The Scope Of The Pretrial Order Allowing Only Limited 
I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence 
Mr. Dunn acknowledges that the district court initially struck the erroneous 
testimony. However, he asserts it was error for the district court to allow the follow-up 
question and answer in which Detective McKenna said that Mr. Dunn had made 
different statements in his more recent interview than when he was interviewed in 1995. 
This evidence was outside the scope of the permitted LR.E. 404(b) evidence and was 
either new, inadmissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, impermissible character evidence, or 
improper impeachment. 
1. The Evidence Was Outside The Scope Of The Pretrial Order Allowing 
Limited I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence 
The State did not offer evidence of Mr. Dunn's minimization or lie about his prior 
criminal conduct involving C.R. merely to show that Mr. Dunn had sexually abused C.R. 
If that was the intended purpose, the State could have stopped its questioning after 
establishing that Mr. Dunn admitted to Detective McKenna that he had molested C.R. 
Instead, the State continued to question Detective McKenna for the express purpose of 
soliciting information that implied Mr. Dunn had minimized or lied about his conduct with 
C.R.; "we're also going to draw some inconsistencies in the statements." (Tr. Trial 1, 
p.342, Ls.2-4.) 
The evidence was clearly outside the scope of the pretrial ruling allowing specific 
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that Mr. Dunn had engaged in sexual acts with C.R. for the 
purposes of proving a common plan or scheme, intent, preparation, identity, and 
absence of mistake. (Tr. Trial 1, p.247, Ls.2-8.) As such, the State sought admission of 
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this specific evidence for an impermissible purpose to prove that Mr. Dunn had lied to 
Detective McKenna. 
2. The Evidence Was Not Admissible I.RE. 404(b) Evidence 
Mr. Dunn's alleged actions of minimizing or lying about his sexual contact with 
C.R. is a prior bad act for which the State did not provide specific notice. Additionally, 
the State did not prove that this minimization was admissible for any of the purposes 
articulated in I.R.E. 404(b). 
a. Relevance For A Non-Pro 
Evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act 
occurred and that the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). 
'The trial court must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a 
material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id. 
(citations omitted.) Evidence of uncharged bad acts is admissible if relevant to a 
material issue such as motive, intent, mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, 
and identity. State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 155 (Ct. App. 1986); See also I.RE. 
404(b). 
The district court was not provided an opportunity to specifically determine 
whether or not Mr. Dunn actually made a statement to Detective McKenna that was 
different than the statements made in 1995. Additionally, the district court did not find 
that the minimization or lying evidence was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) for any of the 
articulated purposes because it was never requested to do so pretrial. 
The evidence is not admissible because it is not relevant to a material issue. 
Whether or not Mr. Dunn lied to police about the full extent of his conduct in 1995 with 
24 
C.R. is not relevant to the ultimate question of his guilt or innocence of the charged 
crimes. Further, it in no way is relevant to show a motive, intent, mistake or accident, 
common scheme or plan, or identity. Instead, this evidence was offered only to show 
that Mr. Dunn has a propensity to lie. Such propensity evidence in inadmissible under 
LR.E. 404(b). 
b. The Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Evidence Was More 
Pre/udicial Than Probative 
Under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if, inter 
alia, the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, danger of misleading the jury, or if the 
evidence would involve needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. Tapia, 
127 Idaho 249, 254 ( 1995). The evidence that Mr. Dunn had minimized or lied about 
his conduct with C.R. during an investigation for engaging in sexual conduct with three 
minors is highly prejudicial. This is a case where there is no physical evidence to prove 
the alleged conduct. Instead, the case hinges on a credibility determination. The jury 
must either believe Mr. Dunn or his accusers. Information that shows Mr. Dunn to be a 
liar is likely to weigh heavily on the jury's credibility determination. As such, the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to exclude the evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403. 
3. The Evidence Is Inadmissible Character Evidence 
The evidence was clearly outside the scope of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence found 
admissible by the district court and was not admissible as new or additional 
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. The evidence is also inadmissible under the alternative theory 
that it is character evidence. I.R.E. 608 states, in relevant portions, that: 
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(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of a 
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion 
or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer 
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ... 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the 
witness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not 
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of 
the court, if probative of ... untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness concerning (1) the character of the witness for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being 
cross-examined has testified. 
LR.E. 608. 
The State sought to introduce evidence that on a specific occasion Mr. Dunn lied 
or minimized his criminal conduct with C.R. (Tr. Trial 1, p.343, L.6 - p.344, L.15.) This 
evidence is clearly inadmissible character evidence under I.RE. 608. As such, 
evidence of this specific instance of conduct is also not admissible character evidence. 
4. The Evidence Is Inadmissible Impeachment Evidence 
During trial, the State asserted that the evidence was impeachment evidence. 
(Tr. Trial 1, p.342, Ls.2-4.) Initially, in striking the first improper question and answer, 
the district court noted that it was premature to introduce the statement as 
impeachment. (Tr. Trial 1 , p.344, Ls.3-7.) However, the district court erred in overruling 
the objection to the second question and answer. 
Impeachment evidence "is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to 
reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains 
why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. Examples of impeachment 
evidence would include prior inconsistent statements ... [andJ ... attacks on [the] 
character of a witness ... " State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69 (Ct. App. 2004) 
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(quoting Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 334-35 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted)). At 
this point in the trial, during the State's presentation of its case in chief, Mr. Dunn had 
not testified. (See generally Tr. Trial 1.) The State cannot impeach Mr. Dunn prior to 
him testifying. As such, this is not a permissible ground for admitting the evidence. 
E. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That Admitting The Evidence Was Harmless 
Error 
The harmless error standard was articulated in section l(E) above and is 
incorporated herein by reference. Because Mr. Dunn objected to the admission of the 
challenged evidence, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (20·10). 
In this instance, because the error was objected to, it is the State's burden to 
prove that admitting the evidence did not contribute to the conviction. Mr. Dunn 
maintains that the error was not harmless because the prejudicial effect of the jury 
improperly hearing the evidence may have influenced the jury's ability to make an 
impartial decision regarding Mr. Dunn's credibility. This danger was increased when the 
prosecution made impermissible arguments regarding this evidence and the evidence 
that was struck immediately prior to this testimony during closing arguments. 
During closing argument, the State presented the following argument: 
What's his motivation today? So there's 1995. He denied doing this, 
admits to it, bull crap, plead guilty, gets in trouble. Gets in trouble in 2011, 
what's his motivation at that point? Told Detective McKenna it's a one 
time thing, when he talked about this. He admitted Crystal's statement 
was correct. 
He said two, disputed multiple, he agrees with Detective 
Lawrence's account of it being multiple times. And told Detective 
McKenna that there were (inaudible) told McKenna it was a one-time slip. 
(Tr. Trial 2, p.165, Ls.8-18.) 
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The closing argument by the prosecutor clearly included information that was 
struck by the district court. Mr. Dunn asserts that this reference to evidence that the jury 
had been told it could not consider was prosecutorial misconduct.7 Violation of a district 
court order governing the presentation of evidence may constitute misconduct. State v. 
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572 (2007). The district court's ruling was clear and the 
prosecutor's total disregard of the order is deliberate misconduct, highlighting for the 
jury evidence it had been told specifically not to consider. 
Any possibility that the district court's actions in limiting the prejudicial testimony 
had reduced the harm to Mr. Dunn was all but removed when the State referenced the 
struck evidence. Due to the nature of the charges, the importance of the jury's 
credibility determination, and the inappropriate reference to the excluded testimony, it is 
likely that the improperly admitted evidence influenced the jury. As such, the State will 
be unable to meet its burden. 
111. 
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Dunn's Fourteenth Amendment 
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors 
Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial 
Mr. Dunn asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless, the 
district court's errors combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error 
doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be 
harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the 
7 Mr. Dunn does not address the prosecutorial misconduct on appeal as a separate 
issue because there was no objection to preserve this issue for appeal. The 
misconduct relates to an evidentiary ruling and, as such, is not reviewable under the 
fundamental error doctrine. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, _, 334 P.3d 806, 822-23 
(2014). 
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defendant's constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 
(Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that 
there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these 
errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 
160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed 
harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial. 
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994 ). However, a finding of cumulative error 
must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 
19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Mr. Dunn asserts that the district court's errors in his trial amounted to actual 
errors depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found 
in sections I and II above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
IV. 
The State Violated Mr. Dunn's Constitutional Rights When It Committed Prosecutorial 
Misconduct At The Sentencing And Rule 35 Hearings 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case which 
requires the vacation of his Judgment of Conviction or the Order Denying Motion on his 
Rule 35 motion. During the sentencing hearing and at the Rule 35 hearing, the 
prosecution committed misconduct which rises to the level of fundamental error 
because the misconduct was related to one or more of Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights 
and was so egregious that it may have contributed to his sentence or the denial of his 
Rule 35 motion. The unfairness created by the prosecutor's misconduct resulted in 
Mr. Dunn being denied due process of law and amounted to a violation of his right to 
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refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, rights that are guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution. 
Although defense counsel did not object to these instances of misconduct, 
Mr. Dunn asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error, was 
not harmless and, this Court should vacate his Judgment of Conviction and the Order 
Denying Rule 35. 
B. Applicable Jurisprudence 
Because Mr. Dunn's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in 
constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). The issues raised by 
Mr. Dunn involve un-objected-to misconduct. Because these claims of error are raised 
for the first time on appeal, Mr. Dunn must establish that the errors are reviewable as 
"fundamental error." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The Idaho Supreme 
Court recently revisited fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for 
fundamental error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first 
show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights" and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear, 
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry 
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test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must 
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome. Id. at 226-228. 
C. Relevant Factual Information 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct 
when he encouraged the district court to punish Mr. Dunn for exercising his 
constitutional rights by refusing to participate in a psychosexual evaluation: 
The evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, and to this 
day, he continues to not own it, to the point - to the extent that he chooses 
to not give this Court mitigating information in a psychosexual evaluation. 
The defendant - and he's always got a great excuse. He has a 
great excuse to the detective why he didn't take the evaluation. He had a 
great excuse for everything he did, including sleeping with the girls and 
everything that he admitted to doing. He always had a great excuse for 
that. 
Oh, he'd take the evaluation, but you can't trust those polygraphs. 
Well, to Joe Public, you know that may resonate. You know some people 
may buy that but those of us that have done these cases for a long time 
and handled these things, that's just simply baloney. We rely on them all 
the time. 
He's had the opportunity, up against a polygraph, to deny this, and 
he chose not to. Why? 
As a parent, we would have figured he would have maintained his 
innocence. And that's fine. That's certainly his right. 
But, again, he was given the opportunity to give this Court some 
information. 
We've had - I've had defense attorneys not want to give me an 
evaluation, and we discussed doing a plea agreement. And then if they 
choose not to, we do an agreement. Later on, when we get down to 
sentencing and I get the evaluation, and my thought is "well, that's not that 
bad," you know, as we compare these different things. 
But, you know, he wants to say that these things are based on the 
fact it's not going to help him at all. That's just simply not true. The Court 
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knows that. He's chosen not to because he knows what will be contained 
in that information. He knows what this Court will learn about his risk. He 
know what this Court will not just assume or suppose but will realize from 
his risk. . .. [W]e have multiple victims not almost 19 years later, he and 
he's chosen not to tell us about any - anything about anyone else. 
And that begs the question what's the defendant's risk? 
(Tr. 2/10/14, p.18, L 15 - p.20, L.24.) 
Prior to pronouncing sentence, the district court noted that it "considered the fact 
that I have no evidence before me to suggest that you are treatable in the community an 
that you do not pose a threat to the community." (Tr. 2/10/14, p.35, Ls.6-9.) 
At the Rule 35 hearing, the prosecutor again presented improper argument 
erroneously encouraging the district court to consider the defendant's refusal to 
participate in a psychosexual evaluation as aggravating evidence: 
We discussed at length, at the time of sentencing, and we would 
have the opportunity to do that same thing today - the defendant has the 
right to alleviate this Court's concerns. The purpose of obtaining a 
psychosexual evaluation and doing a polygraph exam is to allow this 
Court to put into context or put in perspective this defendant's risk. 
And that's the way it should be viewed. Every time I get one of 
those evaluations I've got my concern is here, my fear is here, and I get 
an evaluation and it kind of moves it around from the [sic] there. The 
defendant has the ability and has the right to alleviate this Court's concern 
and yet it chooses not to. Instead he chooses to come before the Court 
and Beg for a certain amount of leniency and without addressing this 
Court's fear. 
Now, counsel makes a comment regarding those other police 
reports - one of those other health welfare reports, and police reports, and 
so forth. The Court understood and, I think, grasped the severity and the 
widespread nature of this defendant's conduct. Now again, those bear 
allegations could have been easily explained, and frankly, easily 
dismissed by Mr. Dunn if he chose to do so, but yet he didn't. He le[f]t this 
Court with that concern coupled with what the Court saw was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt regarding three victims here, one prior, as well 
as the other daughter. So we've got these acknowledged Counts these 
[sic] acknowledged conduct and then we have concern other this other 
conduct and yet he chooses to dispel none of it. 
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(Tr. 4/7/14, p.7, L.25 - p.9, L.5.) 
that: 
In orally pronouncing the ruling on the Rule 35 motion, the district court noted 
And, as was argued today the Court would like to have an evaluation that 
would give me some assessment as to what the likelihood of re-offense 
would be, and in this case I don't have that. ... But understanding the 
responsibilities that the Court has and applying those to the circumstances 
of this case, with this individual, with this history, and without an 
assessment as to whether there is a threat, the Court sees no alternative 
then to maintain what we've done at sentencing and would deny the Rule 
35. 
(Tr. 4/7/14, p.11, Ls.1-15.) 
D. The State Violated Mr. Dunn's Constitutional Ri hts When It Committed 
Prosecutorial Misconduct At The Sentencin And Rule 35 Hearin s 
The prosecution's statements during the sentencing and Rule 35 hearings are 
prosecutorial misconduct which infringe upon Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights. While 
Mr. Dunn acknowledges that it is proper for the district court to note that it does not 
have information about the risk to reoffend, it is not proper for the State to argue that a 
defendant's refusal to furnish this information constitutes an aggravating circumstance 
that requires a harsher sentence or to opine about the nefarious reasons that a 
defendant may have for his refusal. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person 
shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall ... deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[n]o person 
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shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." lo. CONST. art. I, §13. 
The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "does 
not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the 
nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites." Application of 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967). At the time of sentencing, for purposes of a psychological 
evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies. 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563 (2006). Estrada "held that a psychosexual 
evaluation is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution such that the defendant has a ... 
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to participate in the evaluation." Murray v. State, 156 
Idaho 159, 166 (2014) ( citations omitted); see also Estrada, 143 Idaho at 563-65. 
In this case, the prosecution's assertions that Mr. Dunn's failure to participate in a 
psychosexual evaluation should result in a harsher sentence or the denial of his Rule 35 
motion were calculated to encourage the district court to impose a stricter sentence than 
it would have otherwise. These arguments violated Mr. Dunn's rights to refuse to 
participate in a psychosexual evaluation and to due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and the Idaho Constitution. As such, this misconduct directly 
implicates Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights and is reviewable for fundamental error. 
Mr. Dunn asserts that the misconduct in the case at hand is fundamental. The 
error in this case plainly exists from the record and no additional information is 
necessary. It cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a 
defendant sentenced, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible 
grounds presented through misconduct. It could serve no strategic decision to fail to 
object to the prosecutor's impermissible statements about Mr. Dunn's refusal to 
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participate in a psychosexual evaluation. The law regarding a defendant's right to 
refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation and to not have such refusal held 
against him is clear and the prosecutor's statements to the contrary are deliberate 
misconduct. 
!n the present case, this Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Dunn 
his rights to due process of law and to refuse to participate in a psychosexual evaluation 
because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not contribute to 
the sentence. Certainly, the district court noted in both hearings that it was lacking 
information about a risk to reoffend and that the district court was considering the lack of 
information in determining the sentence. It is evident that the district court was 
considered the State's improper argument at the Rule 35 hearing as it noted it "was 
argued today the Court would like to have an evaluation that would give me some 
assessment as to what the likelihood of re-offense would be, and in this case I don't 
have that." (Tr. 4/7/14, p.11, Ls.1-4.) As such, in reviewing the sentencing and Rule 35 
hearings, the prosecutor's improper comments, constituting misconduct, likely 
influenced the district court and the resulting sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Dunn respectfully requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated and 
his case remanded for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that his judgment 
of conviction be vacated and case be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and his 
case be remanded for a new Rule 35 hearing. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2015. 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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